What’s in Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Referendum? – The Diplomat

On June 5, Kazakhs will vote on a package deal of reforms intended to rework the nation from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a strong parliament.”

Six months after Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called protesters terrorists and requested support from the Russian-backed Collective Security Treaty Group to quell mass unrest, residents will take part in a referendum on constitutional reforms. 

The vote will happen on June 5, just one month after the proposed reforms were released. The reform package addresses 33 separate articles – about one third of the overall constitutional articles – and was developed by a working group that Tokayev established in March. The reforms are stated to transform Kazakhstan from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a strong parliament,” per Tokayev’s state of the union tackle on March 16.

A brilliant-presidential system is one where parliaments and courts are solely nominally independent, and the president and their administration have almost limitless management over political decision-making. Kazakhstan’s first step to a super-presidential system was the adoption of a new structure in 1995 that was pushed by Nursultan Nazarbayev after dissolving an uncooperative parliament. Nazarbayev additional consolidated his private powers with constitutional amendments in 1998, 2007, and 2011.

Nazarbayev began to loosen the president’s control with constitutional amendments in 2017 that slightly redistributed presidential powers to different branches of government and opened the trail for the election of native representatives, at the very least on the village level. Nonetheless, Nazarbayev slyly maintained his personal control over Kazakhstan’s politics by including provisions that protected him as “elbasy,” or chief of the nation.

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The proposed constitutional reforms strip the structure of mentions of elbasy and the First President of the Republic, which some see as a continued sign of the Nazarbayev household’s fall from grace. 

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In addition to sidelining Nazarbayev, a number of proposed provisions would barely prohibit the ability of the president. The president should not be a member of a political get together, which member of the working group Sara Idrysheva referred to as “the bravest step of our esteemed president.” In anticipation of this amendment, Tokayev stepped down as chairman of the Amanat celebration – a rebranded version of Nazarbayev’s ruling Nur Otan get together – on April 26. Moreover, the president can not override the acts of akims of oblasts, main cities, or the capital and close relations of the president cannot maintain political posts.

Several proposed measures give parliament more power vis-a-vis the president. Kazakhstan’s parliament will stay bicameral, however the distribution of power between the upper and decrease homes will shift somewhat. The Senate will now not have the facility to make new laws, and instead will just approve or reject legal guidelines handed by the Mazhilis. Furthermore, the process for selecting deputies to each homes will change. 

First, the Mazhilis will be lowered to 98 deputies, following the abolition of 9 seats appointed by the Meeting of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. These seats can be transferred to the Senate, and the Meeting of the Peoples will now solely get to nominate five deputies. The number of deputies appointed by the president might be lowered from 15 to 10.

Second, Mazhilis deputies can be elected according to a combined system. Seventy % of Mazhilis deputies will be chosen by proportional elections, and 30 p.c might be immediately elected.

The only proposed modifications to the judicial system relate to the reestablishment of the Constitutional Court docket. Kazakhstan had a Constitutional Courtroom until the adoption of the 1995 constitution, which instituted a weaker constitutional council. The president still maintains a powerful affect over the Constitutional Court’s make-up, however, with the ability to pick the court docket’s chairman and four of the judges; parliament chooses the opposite three.

Tokayev has emphasized the importance of local governance, marked by the first-ever direct election of village akims and plans to introduce three new oblasts that may convey government bodies closer to the populations they signify. Perhaps probably the most disappointing facet of proposed reforms is the dearth of significant motion on native representation for residents of Kazakhstan’s largest cities. If the referendum passes, Kazakhstanis will get to vote for akims of oblasts, major cities, and the capital – nevertheless, the candidates will have been selected by the president. The best to elect native leadership has been one of the vital consistent demands from Almaty residents, and this attempt to create choice is ultimately beauty.

The proposed reforms are important steps towards real representative authorities in Kazakhstan; nevertheless, they don't necessarily constitute forward movement. Many of the amendments are simply reinstating mechanisms of checks on presidential energy that previously existed, relatively than materially altering the connection between state and society, as Tokayev claims.